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Terrorism and Relative Justice 
Mark Findlay1
 
 
Introduction 
This essay explores representations of justice and terror that demonstrate, through the 
contextual dependence of both phenomena, some under-theorised and largely 
misconstrued connections. Such relationships tend to explain the less effective or 
sometimes exacerbating outcomes of certain control responses to terror2.  In 
particular, through the criminalisation of terrorism and the criminal justice processing 
of control responses, both terrorism and justice are essentially re-interpreted within 
wider agendas for global governance3. 
 
Criminal justice processing of terrorist violence is not exceptional, particularly where 
jurisdiction is uncontested.  Margaret Thatcher declared the Irish para-militaries as 
‘criminals’ and internment converted to imprisonment overnight.  Timothy McVeigh, 
judged responsible for the second most deadly terror attack in contemporary US 
experience was treated as a criminal despite his religiously grounded right-wing 
ideology.  Even, as with the trial of the Lockerbie bombings, where jurisdiction and 
dominion were complex, a specially constituted criminal justice resolution was a 
primary control response.  This paper is more interested in the ‘post 9/11’ predilection 
for violent reactions to terrorist incursions.  Whether this violence is eventually 
tempered by a criminal justice context does not diminish the significance of violent 
retribution as the response of first call. 
 
The following ideas are formative and presented in order to stimulate a more detailed 
empirical examination of the relationships suggested between terrorism and violent 
justice.  The less ambitious agenda for this paper is to identify and outline some 
critical dimensions of the justice/terror nexus, and to propose possible ways it can be 
re-imagined so as to sharpen the prospects for both legitimacy and control potential.4
 
At the outset I disclaim, for the purposes of this paper at least, any direct engagement 
with the rich literature about state crime as terrorism.  Much of this is undervalued in 
a political climate that would rob terrorism of meaning or would even wrongly equate 
                                                 
1  Professor of Criminal Justice, Law Faculty, University of Sydney; Senior Associate Research Fellow, 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London University. 
2 Braithwaite J. (2005) ‘Pre-empting Terrorism’  Current Issues in Criminal Justice 17/1: 96 
3  Discussed more generally in Findlay M. (2006) ‘Governing through Globalised Crime’ (unpublished 
conference paper). 
4  The limits of the paper do not allow for a fully developed critique of contested legitimacies, as these   
exist in both justice and terror contexts.  Suffice to say that misunderstandings about the relativity of 
justice, and the crude de-legitimisation of terrorism underlie much of the political discourse around the 
war on terror. 
an attempt to critically review the abuse of state power, with support for the terrorist 
project. 
 
In addition, while the history of retributive punishment grows out of contexts where 
justice was terror, and its merciful avoidance added power to judicial authority5, the 
present paper accepts the justice/punishment alliance.  Punishment is often violent, 
and justice in its retributive form relies on punishment outcomes6.  Punishment, be it 
for deterrence or retribution, is a powerful purpose for justice as it confronts 
terrorism, in any control strategy. 
 
This is not an empirical substantiation of the relationship between terrorism and 
violent justice responses.  There has as yet been insufficient research into such 
connections, particularly from the perspective of intervention strategies employed by 
states and alliances to counter real or perceived terrorist threats.7  The discourse on 
terrorism today, largely journalistic, or political considerations, or ‘insider stories’8, is 
not well supported by hard data on human and organisational behaviours, or by the 
manner in which these form patterns and reactions.  We would suggest that besides 
the practical barriers to research in the area, without well-developed theoretical 
dimensions for analysing this relationship, the discourse remains confined to 
journalistic assertion and political critique.9  
 
More than this, it might be said that the predominating ‘mythologies’ explored in the 
rest of this paper deny the necessity in the mind of politicians and governments at 
least to gain an empirical understanding of this relationship.  It suits political 
discourse rather to deny the existence of any such relationship in the context of 
legitimate governance.  Therefore, if a sound theoretical connection is proffered, the 
researcher may still battle for access to the data which would enable empirical 
analysis.  This data is all too often concealed within military intelligence and hidden 
in the partial consciousness of contesting agencies and institutions with a real interest 
in seeing it remain secret, or misconstrued. 
 
                                                 
5  For instance see Thompson E.P. (1975) Whigs and Hunters; the origins of the Black Acts, 
Harmondsworth: Peregrine; Hay D., Linebaugh P and Thompson E.P (1975) Albion’s Fatal Tree, 
London, Allen and Lane 
6  For a critical discussion of this see Braithwaite J. and Pettit P. (1990) Not Just Deserts: A republican 
theory of criminal justice, Oxford: Clarendon 
7  Some exceptions to this are represented by Silke A. (2003) ‘Retaliating Against Terrorism’ in A 
Silke (ed.) Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its 
consequences Chichester: Wiley; 93; Silke A (2003) ‘Fire of Iolaus: The role of state counter-measures 
in causing terrorism and what needs to be done’ in T. Bjorgo (ed.) Root Causes of Terrorism: 
Proceedings from an international expert meeting in Oslo Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs; 179. 
8  An example is Heffelfinger C. (2005) Unmasking Terror: A global review of terrorist activities’ 
Washington: Jamestown Foundation. 
9  We are not suggesting that theorising on either component of the relationship is absent.  The work of 
Crenshaw M. ((1994) (ed.) Terrorism in Context ,Pittsburgh: Penn State Press ), Mc Cauley C. ((1991) 
(ed.) Terrorist research and Public Policy London: Frank Cass ) and Silke .( (2004) ‘The Road Less 
Travelled: Trends in terrorism research’ in A. Silke (ed)Research on Terrorism: Trends, achievements 
and failures London: Frank Cass; 186) presents supportive arguments for analysis.  What they do not 
fully achieve is a detailed interrogation of the connections between terror and justice responses in the 
broadest sense. 
This does not mean that the empirical enquiry is futile.  As the current ‘war on 
terror’10 lurches from disaster to disengagement, more is becoming known of the 
utility of violence and its contextualisation, despite the efforts to restrict the flow of 
knowledge.  Electorates, and referential communities are becoming cynical and 
disenchanted with the perceived wisdom of their ideological champions and therefore 
are keener to seek out and receive another story.  The other story of Guantanamo Bay, 
of weapons of mass destruction, secret prisons and rendition, of liberation movements 
in Lebanon, the Sudan and East Timor, and the actual threats of nuclear proliferation, 
are in the public domain.  However, I suspect ‘the facts’ are will remain contested.  
This being so, the analysts’ task is more than finding and formulating data.  It also 
requires a conscious campaign to counter the misrepresentation of the other side.  In 
this way the empiricist cannot resile from the role of advocate for more reasoned, 
even if still partial, representation. 
 
The paper makes its contribution through the utility of the following dimensions 
representing important but often unexplored features of the proposed relationship.  
The application of these dimensions to particular case-studies should offer more than 
empirical enhancement.  The paper will only indicate appropriate contemporary 
examples of the relationship and suggest foundations for their more detailed 
exploration.  After all, this is the purpose of a theoretical overview. 
 
While the discussion to follow remains more philosophical than sociological, more 
conceptual than historical, it follows that for the theorising  to form a foundation of 
empirical enquiry then the disciplinary influences over that enquiry may also benefit 
from a more rigorous structure.  Such a structure is laid out around the relational 
dimensions discussed below. 
 
The initial dimension is violence, its purposefulness, the relativity of this, and the 
manner in which both terror and justice interventions employ and justify violent 
incursion.  Implicit in this dimension is the common practice within dominant 
political alliances, denying purpose to the terrorist, or at least any purpose which can 
claim rationality, and hence that it is legitimate.  The segregation of the 
purposefulness of violence introduces considerations of legitimacy and with them the 
foundations of international authority.  Further, terrorism becomes redefined not only 
in terms of its violence, but also more against its mindless or malicious irrationality. 
 
This moves into the next dimension, where the meaning of violence is contested in the 
violent event.  Considerations of ‘truth’ naturally follow, as the prize for the contest 
and the purpose for violence.  Truth here is obviously a relative concept and in order 
that its legitimating potential is resonant across opposing but supportive referent 
communities, truth is seen to encapsulate common values which bridge the violent 
divide. 
 
In any violent struggle there is the victor and the vanquished.  The contemporary 
political context within which international terrorism and hegemonic justice responses 
are played out is itself predetermined by victory and subjection in a wider and deeper 
historical sense. Victor’s justice may pre-determine the authority foundation through 
                                                 
10  For a charting of the post 9/11 ‘war on terror’ see International Peace Research Institute Oslo (2006) 
Report from the Conference ‘9/11 Five years After: Values, Risk and Identity in the War on Terror’ 
Oslo: PRIO. 
which further justice responses are advanced.  Terror on the other hand is a response 
to victor’s justice as much as it is its precipitant.  Attendant on ‘victory’ is the 
‘morality’ of the struggle.  This is also conceptually connected to interpretations of 
truth and the legitimacy/authority these convey. 
 
One of the spoils of victory is vengeance.  Crucial for the direction of violent 
vengeance (in the guise of retributive justice) is the innocent victim, and the 
monopoly over claims of innocence and the parallel apportioning of guilt.  However, 
as with truth, innocence is both partial and relative.  In turn, blame is vehemently 
contested like any other element of the struggle.  The power to apportion blame is 
evidence of authority, and the resistance against blame in referent communities is a 
profound challenge to legitimacy. 
 
Legitimacy, a binding theme in the struggle for truth over innocence, and to lay 
blame, is relative to actual communities.  Crucial communities for the legitimacy of 
the justice response in particular, are those who would otherwise be resistant to this 
authority.  They are the alternative audience both to the message of justice and the 
irrationality of terror.  They are the conscience to be won over or at least alienated 
from the terrorist mission.   
 
Essential to the version of justice currently marketed against international terrorism, is 
the protection of the individual.  Victimisation, like citizenship and the right to be 
protected is primarily individualised.  Terror on the other-hand is both discounted and 
demonised by devaluing the individual and destroying the innocent victim.  But this is 
a more complex dimension of contest.  Whose value of whose life are crucial 
questions, the answers to which further divide justice and terror, in contesting the 
right to life or its destruction. 
 
These dimensions lead back to the image of contest and struggle over legitimacy, 
authority, versions of truth, rights to innocence and its protection, the power to blame 
or deny its force, and the price of life.  The terrain of distinction, and the prospect of 
reconciliation and restitution remain over the determination of rationality 
 
Purposeful violence11? The utility of justice and terror. 
The utility of terrorism is something that tends to escape consideration in responding 
to the violence essential for its existence12.  At the same time utilitarian 
considerations drive retributive and deterrent paradigms for justice responses to 
terror13.   
 
However, it might be seen as too relativist and subjective to confine our conception of 
terrorism here to claims and counterclaims concerning utility.  The same reservations 
might be directed to measuring terrorism against relative considerations of rationality.  
Particularly when put against the proportional application of violence in order to 
                                                 
11  For a discussion of the psychologies of terrorist violence see McCauley (2005)  The Psychology of 
Terrorism New York: SSRC 
12  See Rotman E. (2000-2001) ‘The Globalisation of Criminal Violence’, in Cornell Journal of Law 
and Public Policy 10/1:1-43 
13  As discussed by Braithwaite J. (2005) ‘Pre-empting Terrorism’, in Current Issues in Criminal 
Justice 17/1:96-114 
achieve stated aims many terrorist endeavours are excessive and irrational against any 
measure. 
 
The quest for an encompassing and more universal definition of terrorism is itself 
misdirected.  Even with their faults, the features of rationality and utility will generate 
contested meanings for terror depending on the nature of the referent community and 
the violent acts perpetuated.  These communities (proponents and victims) are crucial 
to the determination of the cause and cost of terrorism. 
 
In any dialectical sense there is a need to accept, interrogate and employ the relative 
meanings and constructions of terrorism.  In so doing there is a parallel requirement to 
discriminate interpretations of terrorism based on purpose and reason.  As Tamanaha 
argues14, any such approach will return the analysis to fact/value debates.  Avoiding 
the relativist limitations of value judging terrorism or justice, we can follow 
Tamanaha’s invocation to examine value-based interpretations, grounded firmly in the 
factual experience of actual social situations.   
 
In any case, for the purposes of this paper terrorism (and for that matter justice) are 
not encountered on their own.  It is the relationship between terror, and violent justice 
responses that most clearly requires an appreciation of relativities within particular 
community contexts.  Therefore, the social context of processes such as punishment is 
as significant to the investigation of this relationship as might be the supervening 
definitional framework. 
 
Retributive international criminal justice focuses on the punishment of prominent 
perpetrators and if this produces positive consequences for victim communities then it 
is through the legitimate rendition of vengeance on their behalf, as well as the 
symbolic significance for future deterrence, indeterminate as this may be.  So saying, 
victims or their communities are not the central focus for international criminal 
trials15.  In matters before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, for instance, there are statutory protections of victim interests but these 
do not go so far as providing independent victim representation, or formal 
consideration of victim impact.16
 
In the show trials of Saddam Husssein and Slobidan Milosovic the prosecutions were 
presumed to profoundly benefit identified victim communities, as well as potential 
future victims.  There is little empirical evidence that from the victim perspective, 
beyond collective vengeance, the impact of these trials would be deeply felt, or long-
lasting.  Therefore, the question remains regarding the foundations of authority for the 
application of retributive (and eventually violent) justice responses to terrorist acts 
and actors. 
 
                                                 
14  See, Tamanaha B. (1997) Realistic Socio-legal Theory : Pragmatism and a social theory of law, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press 
15  This is critically interrogated in Findlay M. and Henham R. (2005) Transforming International 
Criminal Justice: Retributive and restorative justice in the trial process, Cullompton: Willan 
16  Henham R. & Mannozzi G. (2003) ‘ Victim Participation and Sentencing in England and Italy: a 
legal and policy analysis’ in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 11:278 
It has been recognised that both terrorist acts and their punishment may be interpreted 
as purposeful violence17.  Even so, as the violence associated with punishment 
increases in its scope and intensity, sometimes approaching the nature of the terrorist 
act, then its legitimacy18 comes under challenge, if not its utility19. 
 
To justify an extreme punishment response, the violence and violent potential of 
terrorism is highlighted.  However, a moral assessment of terrorism in terms of 
‘mindless’ violence is compromised by any corresponding excessive violence of 
punishment, particularly where this has consequences for innocent communities, in a 
‘law of war’ scenario.  In addition, its ‘mindlessness’ challenges the deterrent impact 
of violent punishment. 
 
Bentham’s ‘less eligibility’ doctrine as a balance between the utility and humanity of 
punishment risks compromise through the suffering of innocent communities as a 
consequence of the harm caused from the punishment directed against the terrorist.  In 
this situation the retributive rationale for meeting with violent punishment the 
violence of the terrorist against the innocent, is also challenged through the 
commonality of violent reaction. 
 
Claims for utility are dependent on the context of the terrorist and the justice 
response.  So that they are not lost in some confusion of subjectivity, these claims 
need to be reflected against representations of ‘truth’ and ‘fairness’ said to be 
essential for the legitimacy of justice responses.  The morality of truth and fairness 
here, I would argue, depends on the innocence of victim communities which a justice 
response is supposed to champion.  Innocence in turn is the foundation on which 
blame, responsibility and resultant punishment may be more objectively constructed.  
The problem with this is that convincing representations of innocence are also 
contextually relative20. 
Contested meanings? The battle for ‘truth’ or the battle over 
‘blame’ 
When it comes to considerations of ‘truth’ in the context of terrorist struggle, the 
contested nature of truth is obvious if also regularly glossed over.  Truth is what the 
suicide bomber is said to die for and what the military and criminal justice responses 
are set to protect.  Can it be the same truth?  Obviously not.  Then its relativity 
becomes a contested objective of the relationship between terror and ‘justice’ 
responses.  This contested reality is an important theme for empirical inquiry.  How is 
the subjectivity of truth here to be managed beyond the force-based authority and 
supremacy of victor’s justice?21
                                                 
17  See Butler P. (2003) ‘Foreword: Terrorism and Utilitarianism: Lessons from and for the criminal 
law’ in Journal of Criminal law and Criminology 93/1: pp.1-22 
18  For a discussion of the issue of legitimacy in general see Crenshaw M. (1983) Terrorism, 
Legitimacy and Power Middletown: Wesleyan. 
19  Gross E.  (2002-2003) ‘Trying Terrorists – Justification for Differing Trial Rules: The balance 
between security considerations and human rights’, in Indiana International and Comparative Law 
Review 13/1:1-97 
20  See Gaita R. (2001) ‘Terror and Justice’ in P. Craven (ed) The Best Australian Essays 2001, 
Melbourne: Black Inc.; pp.19-36 
21  There is a need here for a more detailed consideration of Weber’s conditions for the authority of the 
state. 
 
The para-military struggle in Northern Ireland has since the partition and the 
imposition of British rule, been a struggle over more than political legitimacy.  Its 
violent ferocity on both sides of the sectarian divide and from the forces of the British 
state is selectively rationalised as the struggle for the truth of Irish nation-hood.  True, 
the triggers for violent events may be religious or cultural bigotry, and the assertion of 
state authority, but the daily contextual reality of the struggle is contested ‘truths’. 
 
In the terrorism/response context (both local and global) it is not so much the nature 
of truth but its contest which is the connection.  The protection of truth is the common 
justification for the exercise of violence on both sides.  Even violent retaliation 
against say ‘genocide’ through terrorism claims its legitimacy against ‘guilty’ or 
‘blameworthy’ violence where truth is at risk.  Yet again the relativity of guilt and 
blame challenge the advance and democratic dominance of a single ‘truth’ on which 
the justice response relies. 
 
The recent conflict in Lebanon where the Israeli military allegedly attacked Hesbolah 
locations in response to the kidnapping of several Israeli soldiers was a stark 
interpretation by Israel and the UK and USA at least that truth remains on one side of 
the battle.  This alliance initially resisted the declaration of a cease-fire even in the 
face of significant and disproportionate casualties because the ‘terrorist violence’ of 
Hesbolah needed first to desist.  Despite the tragic consequences for referent victim 
communities in Lebanon resulting from the violence of the Israeli ‘justice response’ 
the alliance conceded no terror there.  The same was not the view of international aid 
agencies and other national, regional and international institutions condemning the 
violence on both sided in terms of its impact on victim communities. 
 
In contest, where responses to terrorism claim the legitimate use of violence, is ‘moral 
standing’.  Those on the other hand who promote re-integrative techniques as against 
retribution, to more effectively manage original violence, recognise that restorative 
justice relies on the context of a supportive community if shaming is to be positively 
applied to offenders.22  Without a supportive context, dependent on a common 
acceptance of the moral standing of the preferred response, attempts at shaming break 
down as stigmatic rather than re-integrative.  Resort to violence is soon reiterated. 
 
However, in the context of terrorism/response relationships moral standing is at the 
centre of the contest for legitimacy.  Reflective communities in which both the 
terrorist and the justice responses are marketed, may oppose the moral legitimacy of 
each other.  These are communities in part galvanised through resistance to the 
external and oppositional claims for moral standing.23
 
Particularly damaging to the justice response is the resistance of terrorist 
‘communities’ over the basis of moral standing.  Dworking’s components of the 
moral standing of law (determinacy, integrity, coherence and wholeness24) are 
difficult for the violent justice response to export when new institutions and processes 
                                                 
22  See Braithwaite J. (1989) Crime Shame and Re-integration Oxford: oxford University Press. 
23  Moral standing as a legal/constitutional claim to legitimate voice is discussed in Winter S. (1988) 
‘The Metaphor of standing and the Problem of Self Governance’, in Stanford Law Review 40: 1371 
24  For a discussion off these see West R. (1999) ‘Taking Moral Argument Seriously’, in Chicago Kent 
Law Review 74/2:499-562.  
of incarceration, interrogation, trial and punishment are directed to the terrorist 
opponent.  These novel entities generally contradict or at least strain some of the 
central protections which make criminal justice in general fair and ‘just’.25   
Victor’s justice? The authorised morality. 
In opening the war crimes tribunal in Nuremburg the US Chief Prosecutor observed: 
The five great nations flush with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand 
of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgement of 
the law is one of the most significant tributes the Power has paid to Reason26. 
The Nuremburg and Tokyo trials established the courts (military tribunals) and the 
criminal trial as the legitimate arena for holding accountable those who the victorious 
in war determine as responsible for ‘crimes against humanity’.  The eventual 
limitations of the ‘tribunal’ approach, and the emergence of a ‘second order’ justice 
paradigm which investigates truth and responsibility as opposed to fact and liability, 
is a feature of the development of international criminal justice.27
 
Narveson has identified three characteristics of ‘immorality’ in terrorism: 
• The sense of risk it causes the public at large; 
• The powerlessness people have from being put at risk; and  
• The ‘apparent absurdity’ of attacking an innocent (and disengaged) victim for 
a political goal28. 
 
Again, the attribution of morality and immorality relies in part on the ascription of 
innocence and the status of victimisation.  Concepts of ‘risk’, ‘powerlessness’ ‘guilt’, 
‘injury’ and ‘blame’, are empowered where awarded on behalf of the innocent victim 
against the unjustified perpetrator.  Terrorist communities become the victims in very 
similar contexts but from the perspective of victor’s justice little regard is paid to their 
‘victimisation’, evolving as a necessary consequence of that justice doing its job. 
 
As mentioned above, the ‘morality’ of the justice response (or the terrorist act for that 
matter) requires either community respect or super-imposed violence (force) to 
condition its ‘standing’ and ensure compliance.  If the claim for standing relies on 
force rather than respect then the resistance of recipient communities is an important 
consideration in fashioning the response and expectations for its effectiveness.   
 
‘Standing’ even in the legal, non-metaphysical sense has largely eluded analysis of 
the terrorism/response relationship.  A reason for this is that if ‘standing’ is to have an 
essential influence over the prosecution of a particular version of truth or justice, then 
the arena within which it is claimed must be mutually respected.  Particularly at this 
level, the ‘morality’ of victor’s justice is contested by terrorist violence. 
                                                 
25  For a discussion of the detail of these changes in US criminal justice and their impact on due process 
see, Gross E. (2002) ‘Trying Terrorists – Justification for Differing Trial Rules: The balance between 
security considerations and human rights’, in Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 
13/1:1-98. 
26  Quoted in Ferencz B. (2003) ‘The International Criminal Court: The first year and future prospects’, 
in American Society of International Law Proceedings v. 97: p.259 
27  For a deeper discussion of this read Findlay & Henham. (2005) 
28  Narvenson J. (2001) ‘Terrorism and Morality’ in R. Frey & C. Morris (eds) Violence, Terrorism and 
Justice, Cambridge: CUP:pp.116 at 124-125. 
 
 
Credibility does not inextricably attend victory in armed struggle. This realisation, as 
much as any desire for justice and the rule of law lies behind the transfer of the 
‘enemy’ from the battlefield to the tribunal.  Paradoxically, the terrorist would hold 
victory against hegemonic domination in recent military conflict.  At the same time 
the terrorist employs armed struggle in an effort at least to advance a cause to the 
point where its status in the contest is recognised as meriting a significant (if aberrant) 
justice response. 
 
The ambiguity of violence as both a challenge to and a confirmation of hegemonic 
domination is widely apparent in the process of redefining statehood on ‘the global 
periphery’.  Here in transitional and separatist ‘states’ where ‘global norms regarding 
the claims of armed groups to self determination and sovereign state-hood are 
changing’29 violence is transacted from the status of terrorist coercion to legitimate 
armed struggle along with the transformation to political legitimacy and global 
recognition. 
 
A difficulty with any dialectic between the terrorist and the legitimate state is the 
problematic composition of both entities, and not just their contested claims to 
authority.  Conventional political theory, with its focus on the state as an arena and on 
its agents in domestic politics fails to consider the place of ‘para-politics’ and the 
‘deep state’ within the transaction of terrorism.30  Conventional international relations 
theory with its emphasis on sovereign states as coherent agents of international 
affairs, largely ignores the ‘states-within-states’ which are a feature of terrorist 
engagement in many transitional political and cultural locations.  Para-politics by 
contrast is the consideration of ‘divided sovereignty’ with features such as illegal 
trade, substitute taxation, alternative ‘armies’ and mechanisms of violence.  These 
operate beyond the reach of conventional state authority and as in Lebanon, may 
benefit from significant if clandestine sponsorship with the official organs of the state.  
These ‘deep-states’ make the discourse of ‘victor’s justice’ and ‘us-and-them’ 
retaliatory control strategies anything but clear. 
 
Victims’ vengeance? The partiality of innocence. 
It is the image of the victim that drives both the terrorist act and the justice response.  
Who has the legitimate claim to innocence is another matter in contest.  The 
perspective from which it might be resolved depends essentially on relationships of 
violence which determine who is revenging whom.  In this regard the connection is 
not only between the terrorist and the justice response but also between each and their 
respective ‘victim communities’. 
 
With no shared (if not common morality), and a resultant relativity in justice as a 
justification for violent response31, the struggle regresses to issues of guilt and 
                                                 
29  For a discussion of separatist states and their application of violence to early state-formation see 
Reno W. (2006) ‘Redefining Statehood in the Global Periphery’ (unpublished conference paper). 
30  For a discussion of both concepts see Tunander O. (1997) Geo-politics in Post Wall Europe: 
Security, Territory and Identity London: Sage. 
31  Up until now I have been connecting justice and violence in a fairly casual and erratic fashion.  It is 
useful to recall particular forms of punishment as the legitimate inclusion of violence in justice. 
innocence.  However, as where due process at least uniformly evidences criminal 
justice, guilt is a consequence of the most convincing prosecution, and innocence is 
more a failure of proof than an absolute state.  Even where the innocent victim is 
claimed as the vindication for violent vengeance, it is the guilt of the combatant which 
is more likely to move the violent response, than any deep empathy for the victim’s 
situation.  From this, violent retribution and deterrence feature more apparently in the 
global ‘war against terror’ than does any return to broader interests of human 
security.32
 
Violent punishment as a feature of the justice response will comfort one victim 
community while at the same time alienating and enraging others.  The divergent 
reception of such violent punishment either as justice or state terror, is determined by 
support or at least tolerance from one community, and the resistance of others.   
 
In some respects this mirrors the localised re-interpretation of political corruption 
against a wider contest for democratic legitimacy.  For example, the recent history of 
‘democratic’ presidential electioneering in the Philippines has been a history of moral 
paradox.  The wider community and their political representatives are declared 
opposed to illegal lottery gambling (jueteng) and yet it was the slush funds behind the 
lottery that bank-roles presidential campaigning.33 The electorate understands this 
corruption as much as it tolerates the lottery.  The intersection is blatant and recurrent.  
It is only when this corruption spills over into violent reprisals or is exposed by 
political rivals that the power of community neutralisation gives way to calls for 
reform. 
Communities of Resistance? The alternative audience. 
In the terror/justice nexus, communitarian considerations do not feature anywhere to 
the same extent as does individual responsibility, outside the setting of terrorist 
victimisation.  But one of the most significant dangers in ignoring communitarian 
interests when analysing terrorism and justice, is to confound and confuse the 
importance of resistance.  Terrorism defined as political struggle rather than mindless 
evil, gains its credibility from support communities34.  These communities galvanise 
around the terrorist cause (if not the terrorist act): 
• First in recognising the terrorist as the representative of their claims for 
vengeance and justice;  
• Next as supporting the terrorist cause in resisting ‘unjust’ justice responses; 
and 
• Finally, legitimating the ongoing terrorist struggle through resisting the 
imposition of competing and contested meanings about justice and terror. 
 
This process of neutralisation/legitimation may even involve flirtation with organised 
criminal enterprise enforced through violence as a means to maintain economic 
                                                 
32  For a discussion of the potentials in a ‘human security’ approach to the pressures resultant from 
social development (often argued as fertile ground for terrorism) see Jones J. (2004) ‘Human Security 
and Social Development’ in Denver Journal of International law and Policy 33/1:92-103. 
33  For a discussion of this history see McCoy A. (2006) ‘Invisible Industry: Jueteng Gambling and 
Philippine Politics’ (unpublished conference paper). 
34  The importance of victim communities as referents for terrorism is discussed in Silke A (2003) (ed) 
Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences 
Chichester: Wiley.  
viability and to attack the social cohesion of rival states.  Therefore, for instance, the 
recent opening up of drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan, through Tajikistan and 
into Russia has been fostered through unwholesome alliances between a fragile 
producer state, a compromised international presence, an unstable and economically 
non-viable transit state, and a well developed organised crime market in the reception 
state.35 Each referent community along the way, and their governments, employ the 
negative back-drop of global political domination and economic/cultural imperialism 
as in part justifying what might otherwise be more objectively condemned. 
 
Another consequence of ignoring the subjective meaning of resistance in ‘terrorist 
communities’ is that the potential to reverse the bonds of cohesion as part of the 
justice response will be overlooked in favour of punitive attacks on legitimacy.  It is 
throughout the experience of social exclusion in general, that genuine and creative 
attempts to engage with oppositional communitarian meanings and to counter 
resistance through positive rather than negative interaction, can diminish or even 
reverse competing legitimacies. 
 
Justice requires an audience.  Punishments’ significant others36 may either justify and 
reward violence exercised in their stead, or alternatively reject violent punishment as 
a further injustice against the innocent. 
 
Another important consideration for the nature and legitimacy of the justice response 
is to turn communities of resistance to the conviction of ‘not in our name’.  No 
community is homogeneous and even those clustered around a defensive or resistant 
ideology may at least divide around degrees of acceptable violence.  If the justice 
response can expose (rather than emulate) the excessive violence of the terrorist act 
then such communities should fragment over the justification for violence and its 
alternative realities.  The susceptible segments of these communities may become 
unwilling to legitimate terrorism in their name if it is clearly portrayed as excessive, 
disproportionate or ungoverned violence. 
Primacy of the Individual? The value of life. 
Understandings of terrorism and its motivations, particularly of suicide bombing are 
often muddied by misconceptions over the value of life.  The suicide bomber is 
dehumanised by accusations of having no respect for the lives of innocent victims.  
More so, the self-centredness of the act is emphasised through mocking the rewards of 
martyrdom.  As with the earlier discussion of contested meanings, restricting the 
representation of victim communities to the dead and injured from a suicide bomb, 
ignores the more powerful justification for the terrorist act, that being revenge for 
other communitarian interests.  In the words of one of the co-conspirators in the 
bombing of the World Trade Centre in 1993: 
The American people must know that their civilians who got killed are no 
better than those who are getting killed by American weapons and support37. 
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The respect for human life is impugned against the suicide terrorist who sacrifices 
himself and takes along the innocent victim as well.   
 
With the protection of human life as an essential motivation broadcast with the justice 
response, the terrorist’s apparent disregard for individual and general deterrence 
denies the instrumentalist potential of the ultimate punishment.  Where the terrorist 
rejects the influence of punishment, only the lives and futures of the communities of 
resistance remaining become bargaining currency if deterrence continues crucially 
connected to individualised notions of the value of life. 
 
The ‘law of war’ which features both in terrorist ideology and in unique justice 
responses to global terror, recognises the utilitarian justifications for sacrificing the 
innocent.  Yet, on which side the sacrifice should be made in order that it is 
represented as either ‘friendly fire’ or terrorist atrocity, presents a subjective 
evaluation even of the sanctity of human life. 
Maintaining Dichotomies? The ‘us and them’ story. 
Definitions of terrorism as illegal and immoral, and representations of terrorists as 
irrational and inhumane, perpetuate the essential divide between good and evil, war 
and terror, legal and illegal, so essential for the ‘righteousness’ of a justice response.  
However, it is important to contest these dualities if justice control strategies are to 
avoid further galvanising the divide which in turn justifies terrorist communities: 
In the absence of specific evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to impute 
to terrorism no lesser rationality than that which social analysts routinely 
ascribe to other actors and which, in any event, is requisite for the conduct of 
their operations.  Rational agents are not systematically unable to distinguish 
efficacious from inefficacious activities38. 
 
Dichotomies also lie at the heart of definitions which see terrorism as illegitimate 
‘war’, aberrant politics, or misguided morality:  Lomsky continues: 
…any purported definition of terrorism will itself be laden with moral and 
political baggage.  Most individuals who employ violent means in their 
political activities prefer to speak of themselves as ‘urban guerrilla’, 
‘revolutionary’ or some such.  Thus the bromide ‘one person’s terrorist is 
another’s freedom fighter’.  One need not accede to the implied relativism to 
acknowledge the absence of firm and generally accepted criteria of application 
for ‘terrorism’ and its cognates39. 
 
From this too can be drawn a more complex image of the terrorist struggle and the 
‘corrective’ response, beyond the realm of bilateral military analogy.  This is not 
simply a tension between states or separatists, cultures or counter-cultures, ideologies 
and hegemonic alliances.  It is, through terrorist violence and the violent ‘justice’ 
response that the democratic state and the ‘deep state’ contest.  It is where the ‘deep 
state’ employs terrorist violence (and its infra structure and foot soldiers), as a 
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precursor to manipulating the justice response to confuse and violently undermine 
democracy as the functional authority for apparent state governance.40
 
The suggestions that there can be, or are meaningful relationships between terrorism 
and justice responses verges on the heretical in a political climate where truth is no 
longer marketed as relative, justice is only subject to a single ‘democratic’ morality, 
blame travels in only one direction and innocence crosses no violent divide.  Yet, this 
simple and singular political reality seems incapable of promoting easy effective or 
lasting victories in the war on terror.  Such may depend on a more realistic 
recognition of the place of violence in struggles for global governance that recognises 
and explores symmetries as well as difference. 
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